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Showing posts with label laboratory confirmation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label laboratory confirmation. Show all posts

Are fewer Ebola virus disease cases being confirmed than previously?

A very quick graph plotting the proportion (percentage, %) of laboratory-confirmed Ebola virus disease (EVD) cases reported by the WHO over time. That is, the of samples taken from clinically suspected EVD cases that are RT-PCR positive for Ebola virus in a given report, divided by the total number of suspected + probable + confirmed cases in that report.

Taken from my static
EVD tallies and graphs
page here
. Updated
28JAN2015 AEST.
Click on graph to enlarge. 
Looking at the graph below, it seems like a lower proportion of total cases are being confirmed now compared to before the total case load began decreasing (especially from December onwards-see adjacent graphic). 

Presumably this is due to the larger number of other infectious diseases in the region that cause signs and symptoms, especially early signs and symptoms, that cannot be easily clinically differentiated from EVD; more suspect cases that don't test positive for EVD than before.

When considered in the context of the now smaller number of EVD cases overall, the non-EVD infection's background "noise" has become louder.

But the bottom line is that EVD cases are steadily declining thanks to the many efforts of many people and the changes to habits, traditions and practices that increased risky contact.

The proportion (%) of EVD detection that are laboratory confirmed at each World Health Organization Situation Report or Situation Summary. Anomalous values have been removed. Click on graph to enlarge.

The control gap...

v2 300914
I have a theory.

This theory is meant only to apply to disease outbreak/epidemic/pandemic situations, and then only to those which include fatal cases.

This theory of mine has only emerged since I've been plotting Ebola virus cases numbers from the West African epidemic. I precede the explanation with the caveat that there is very probably already a well developed, well-known actual epidemiology term to describe this theory. But I'm not a trained epidemiologist and this is just a blog, so please forgive me my ignorance.

The theory goes that when a gap grows between the number of new cases being reported and the number of deaths or laboratory confirmations in that population, despite the outbreak having been going for a while, this represents an indication that control of the situation is slipping, or has been lost. 

Mind the gap.

This "control gap" - my term, so don't expect to find it anywhere official or that knows of that which it speaks - can also appear when looking at suspected or probable cases of disease X, and the number of those that have been confirmed by a laboratory test.

Other explanations for the control gap may exist of course; testing may be scaled back deliberately, reporting of deaths may have been deliberately throttled for some political reason. So it may not reflect being "out of control" as much as someone else being "in control".

Probably still more variations that I have not thought of at all.

Ebola virus disease (EVD) in Liberia.

In the graphics below I've used the accumulation of World Health Organization data for Liberia, up to 23-Sept. 

First up - the fold increase in total case numbers (suspect+probable+laboratory confirmed) compared to the fold-increase in the distance between that total and the total number of laboratory confirmed cases alone. This distance, or the "control gap|lab", has widened over time. It has widened because total cases have climbed more steeply than the number given a laboratory confirmed diagnosis of EVD. 

For whatever reason(s), laboratory confirmations are not keeping pace with the total case numbers, and they seemed to start slipping at the end of July. 

I suspect a principal reason - and I'm not on the ground of course, so this is all speculation and second-hand knowledge - is that laboratory capacity is overwhelmed. 

Other reasons include that samples might not always be collected or that many recent clinically defined EVD cases are actually due to something clinically similar to EVD, but not an Ebola virus infection. If it were this last one though, the total numbers would be readjusted downwards as new diagnoses were made...if the laboratory has time to make those of course...so I doubt it as a major role.

The control gap|lab
A.) Ebola virus disease case graph for Liberia showing the accumulation of total (suspect+probable+laboratory confirmed) cases (pink line; left y-axis) and deaths (blue line; left y-axis), the laboratory confirmations (green line; left y-axis) and the proportion of fatal cases (right y-axis) at each reporting date (x-axis). The size of the gap between laboratory confirmed cases and total cases is indicated for a range of reporting dates, using a vertical green drop-line.

B.) The drop-lines have been copied and aligned and the amount they have grown has been measured using a scale bar so that the fold-increase can be compared to the first reporting date used, 8-July. The fold-increase value is written at the top of each drop-line. Along the bottom (enclosed within a grey box) are the case numbers at each reporting date examined and the fold-increase (in bold) compared to the 8-July baseline.


Next up -the fold increase in total case numbers (suspect+probable+laboratory confirmed) compared to the fold-increase in the distance between that total and the total number of deaths. The control gap|deaths comparison finds that the deaths and the total cases don't diverge as much as total cases and lab confirmations do. 


The control gap|deaths
A.) Ebola virus disease case graph for Liberia showing the accumulation of total (suspect+probable+laboratory confirmed) cases (pink line; left y-axis) and deaths (blue line; left y-axis), the laboratory confirmations (green line; left y-axis) and the proportion of fatal cases (right y-axis) at each reporting date (x-axis). The size of the gap between laboratory confirmed cases and deaths is indicated for a range of reporting dates, using a vertical blue drop-line.

B.) The drop-lines have been copied and aligned and the amount they have grown has been measured using a scale bar so that the fold-increase can be compared to the first reporting date used, 8-July. The fold-increase value is written at the top of each drop-line. Along the bottom (enclosed within a grey box) are the number of deaths at each reporting date examined and the fold-increase (in bold) compared to the 8-July baseline.

So with that visualization under our belt, there is another, less laborious way to look at this, by graphing the numbers, rather than the gaps.

What we see when we plot the fold-change values against report date is that total cases lost control as we suspected, but deaths are less obviously out of control. From 9-Sept onwards the gap has widened a little more consistently. Before that though the deaths did not dramatically drift away from the rate at which new cases were being added.

I'll graph Sierra Leone, Guinea and Nigeria in the next day or two. Nigeria should serve as an example of how this looks for a country in which EVD is definitely in control. 


Graphing the control gaps


MERS-CoV in the Netherlands...a detail analysis of cases

Red arrow indicates where Dutch 
MERS-CoV case sequences sit.
Click on tree to enlarge
This comes from a shiny newly released Eurosurveillance report from Dutch researchers. 

I've marked up my earlier tree to show where (based on partial 4,000nt fragment) the sequence from the Netherlands MERS-CoV positive cases (near identical) sits.

I've also charted Case 1's laboratory testing course, to show the variability of virus detection when a very thorough sampling and testing investigation is conducted. 

Viral RNA remained detectable in the blood for all days tested demonstrating viraemia (well, RNAaemia technically) from day-4 onwards. Urine was not positive but a faecal sample was, on day-5. The latter has implication for infection control in hospital settings whereby flushing toilets creating aerosols could be another contributor to spread.

Reverse transcription real-time polymerase chain reaction (RT-rtPCR) results are shown as positive (tall bars), negative (stumpy bars) or not tested (empty space) plotted against day of sampling.
Click on image to enlarge.

This is, as far as I'm aware, is only the second time human faeces or urine have been found to contain signs of MERS-CoV.

A throat swab was positive early on and then again after a 2-day period of negativity. This points to the possibility of shedding for over a week, when associated with cough. But given that this case was part of a tour group and they didn't all become symptomatic, MERS-CoV still didn't spread efficiently or result in disease very often (if it did spread), for whatever reason(s). Antibody testing would be interesting here too.

It would also be very interesting to know whether virus was being shed during the initial diarrhoea in Case 1, which predated his return to the Netherlands by about 8-days, or whether that was unrelated to the MERS-CoV infection. Perhaps testing faeces for gastrointestinal viruses would be useful, or interesting, here.





Ebola virus disease and lab testing...

Virology Down Under's latest Ebola virus case case chart.
Click on chart to enlarge.
Maia Majumder has posted a nice concise comment on her blog. In her latest post [1] she notes that we shouldn't be too surprised that the number of Ebola virus disease (EVD) cases with a lab confirmation (conf) represent a relatively low proportion of the total cases we hear about. 

Currently (see the chart above), 35.3% are lab confirmed. That's 59 confirmed among 167 cases; the remainder are suspected [susp] or probable [prob] cases.[3]

What might contribute to the speed of laboratory confirmation in this and other EVD outbreaks? 

Some thoughts below:
  • Obtaining a specimen. If a body has already been hidden, buried or otherwise disposed off before a sample can be collected. Sampling may have been refused by next of kin-although I am not at all sure if that is a "thing"  during an EVD outbreak
  • The need to work under enhanced safety conditions to prevent laboratory-acquired infections. BSL4/PC4 not strictly available to the field labs (although they are setup to work with those pathogens; see Tweet below), but increased care and awareness still slows down the diagnostic process compared to testing for a much less fatal virus
  • The generally tough conditions for doing precise and careful lab work in a mobile laboratory; work that is often resource-, temperature- and power-sensitive not to mention fiddly and in need of well-controlled experimental conditions
  • Distance from the site of collection to qualified lab and the quality of sample once it reaches that lab. A sample that sat around in the sun or was accidentally frozen, lost, broken, sent to the wrong place, may be falsely or weakly negative requiring further testing
  • The case is positive for a different virus but one that causes similar signs and symptoms. This may also require additional testing to identify. Other virus testing may be run in parallel..or may not
  • You could argue that previous outbreaks used older and often much slower diagnostic methods. That's true, if you compare them side-by-side in a results race. In practice, PCR-based testing comes with lots of extra "bits" that can slow down the production of a final result. The process is still faster than things used to be, quite possible more  sensitive too, but still not as fast as we'd all like. Apples and oranges though.

What defines a suspected case requiring testing anyway? 

Pretty much the same things that define this for any outbreak; a suspected case is a person with the appropriate signs and symptoms of disease, who was in the right place at the right time to have come into contact with a known infected human or animal in such a way that they may have exposed themselves to virus, but they have not yet received a lab confirmation that they have that virus. It may be that a case never receives that confirmation because of a lack of positive specimens (don't have specimen or cannot get a positive result) in which case the person becomes a probable case if they meet the clinical criteria but cannot be confirmed. 

Why would a sample not be collected? 

As noted above, perhaps the next of kin did not allow samples to be collected, perhaps the body was disposed of before sampling could be achieved or perhaps the lab testing failed. To safeguard against the latter, PCR-based testing (not the only method) usually involves multiple assays, running replicates of each sample, and using several assays, each preferably targeted to a spatially different region of the viral genome to overcome the negative impact of any genetic changes in relying on a single site. Such viral genetic change may be an issue during a new outbreak. We haven't seen much by way of sequence analysis from any viral detections to date, but very early on in this outbreak the species was confirmed using genetic sequence determination, to be a strain of the species Zaire ebolavirus.

The numbers are constantly changing.

After all that, even a probable case may still get be discarded after lab test results are in; it may have been a suitably relevant disease, but caused by infection with a completely different virus.

While I think many of us understand that the numbers do change, I also think some of the interest we have in wanting to see them is to understand which way the trends are changing; up, down, steep, flat etc. There has been a fair bit of cautioning about the numbers. In my own defence, these numbers are real. They are collected by people on the ground. They are a much better metric to watch, changeable or not, than the many headlines and blogs and Tweets that may be more aimed at attracting readers and followers, or just be ill- or uninformed.

So the numbers change. What does that mean? As it stands, the Sierra Leone cases have now been taken off the Ebola tally because they were confirmed as haemorrhagic fevers due to a completely different virus; Lassa virus. A suspected EVD case in a child tested negative in Ghana. 2/6 suspected cases from Mali have also tested negative for the Zaire ebolavirus. The Liberian hunter thought to be an isolated EVD acquisition [8,9,10] not linked to Guinea, has now tested negative for the virus. So the numbers change quickly. That's your proof and it confirms what WHO's Gregory Haertl has been saying since Day 1 of this outbreak. These changes have effects too.

The fatal case percentage may rise despite more cases testing negative.

Not as strange as it sounds.

If the number of susp/prob cases drops as some are discarded because the lab confirms they are not EVD, the proportion of cases that are confirmed and died due to EVD will "look" larger-it will be a bigger percentage. The proportion of fatal cases currently sits around 63% of all susp/prob/conf cases now (up from a lowest point of 59%, down from a high of 72%). If the denominator (total susp/prob) cases should shrink while the numerator (fatal EVD cases) remains steady, or grows, the ratio will grow. Be prepared for that and the accompanying headlines or poorly informed Tweets and comments that will scream "the virus is mutating" blah blah blah. It probably isn't. It probably won't. But you may not get that message from using Google alone (try the links below and work your way up).

This EVD outbreak is proving especially challenging.

The term "challenging" seems to have become an agreeable descriptive for both the WHO and MSF, at last, as of yesterday's WHO virtual press conference[5]

The challenges that differentiate this Ebola outbreak from previous mostly seem to be about the wide spread of cases around the countries of both Guinea and Liberia, complicated by the presence of other pathogens that cause clinically similar diseases. More usual problems for tracking, identifying and confirming EVD cases are listed above including working under the requirements of enhanced safety and the need to bring in many essential resources. Careful and accurate confirmation of cases by the lab is a time-consuming process but one that must be given that time in order to ensure it gets the right result. False-negative results or lab-acquired infections would be a very bad outcome at any time but especially if resulting from an unnecessarily rushed testing process. False-positive results have an arguably larger negative impact on the entire situation. Timeliness is a very subjective thing. But lab confirmation is most definitely not like making a cup of coffee.

Can we see the forest for the trees yet?

The most recent EVD susp/prob/conf cases became symptomatic on 06-April-14, but no new healthcare workers were among them and some cases are now being discharged .[4] Some good news there.

We're obviously not out of the woods yet (pardon the pun) in terms of transmission chains. The WHO suggests it will be "some months" before we stop seeing cases. But the recent WHO virtual media conference stressed that while EVD is a serious disease it is one that can be controlled and the risk of infection is low, when the right precautions are in place.[5]

See the latest WHO-AFRO Ebola in Western Africa Situation Update also. It's got totals and charts!! Bloomberg quicktake webpage [6] and the US CDC webpages [7] have lots of digestible information too.

References...
  1. #Ebola2014: On the Topic of Lab-Confirmation
    http://maimunamajumder.wordpress.com/2014/04/08/ebola2014-on-the-topic-of-lab-confirmation/
  2. WHO-AFRO Ebola virus disease (EVD), West Africa Situation Report 07-Apr-14.
    http://www.afro.who.int/en/clusters-a-programmes/dpc/epidemic-a-pandemic-alert-and-response/outbreak-news/4089-dashboard-ebola-virus-disease-in-west-africa-07-april-2014.html
  3. WHO GAR DON Ebola virus disease (EVD), West Africa Update 07-Apr-14
    http://www.who.int/csr/don/2014_04_07_ebola/en/
  4. SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES IN RESPONSE TO GUINEA EBOLA EPIDEMIC
    M�decins Sans Fronti�res Press Release 08-Apr-2014
    http://www.msf.org.au/media-room/press-releases/press-release/article/successes-and-challenges-in-response-to-guinea-ebola-epidemic.html
  5. Audio file for WHO virtual press Conference
    http://terrance.who.int/mediacentre/presser/WHO-RUSH_Ebola_outbreak_Guinea_presser_08APR2014.mp3
  6. Bloomberg's QuickTake on Ebola
    http://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/ebola/
  7. The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention on Ebola in West Africa, 2014
    http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/guinea/
  8. Liberia reports suspected Ebola outbreak unconnected to Guinea
    http://news.yahoo.com/liberia-reports-suspected-ebola-outbreak-unconnected-guinea-130714958.html
  9. LIBERIA: Ebola Deaths Rise In Liberia, Health Minister Confirms
    http://www.gnnliberia.com/articles/2014/04/05/liberia-ebola-deaths-rise-liberia-health-minister-confirms
  10. Liberia: An isolated Ebola case
    http://crofsblogs.typepad.com/h5n1/2014/04/liberia-an-isolated-ebola-case.html

Influenza in Queensland, Australia...

Image adapted from Geoscience Australia,
The Australian Government.
http://www-a.ga.gov.au/web_temp/1531782/61756.pdf
Hot, humid and sunny are the conditions here just now. Although some rain around too-stormy rain with big dumps of water an flash flooding. Must be summer.

In the previous week's Queensland Health Statewide Communicable Disease Surveillance Report it looks as though we have a slight uptick in laboratory confirmed influenza cases so far this year (this is in total numbers, not proportions of samples tested, so take the value with a grain of NaCl) compared to the year-to-date totals for 2013 and 2012 in Queensland Australia.


As of the the 13-Jan update (data from 12.1.2014)


  • 106 case notifications in 2014
  • 73 cases by this time in 2013
  • 41 cases by this time in 2012
  • 144 cases by this time in 2011
  • 21 cases by this time in 2010
  • 12 cases by this time in 2009

More confirmation that rapid influenza diagnostic tests (RIDTs) should be used in context

The Texas Department of State Health Services have a useful couple of paragraphs from an Influenza Health Alert that puts into context reliance on the convenient and rapid, but ultimately intensive rapid influenza tests.


Rapid Lab Tests: Rapid Influenza Diagnostic Tests (RIDTs) can be useful to identify influenza virus infection, but false negative test results are common during influenza season. Clinicians should be aware that a negative RIDT result does NOT exclude a diagnosis of influenza in a patient with suspected influenza. When there is clinical suspicion of influenza and antiviral treatment is indicated, antiviral treatment should be started as soon as possible, even if the result of the RIDT is negative, without waiting for results of additional influenza testing.


Mike Coston also has an excellent article touching on some of the many other viruses that can cause influenza-like illness and on rapid testing, over on his blog, Avian Flu Diary. I highly recommend it.

Cost is always an important factor when hospitals and attached diagnostic laboratories consider how to address infections. Rapid turnaround time is another major cost because, for those small number of viruses with this option available, an antiviral drug can be administered and there seem to be benefits from doing this as early as possible for severe influenza. In some cases of course, a vaccine is available to block severe disease from occurring when you get infected (they don't stop infection, but a response to a vaccine is much safer than a bad response to an actual virus infection, as we've seen in the recent media for H1N1 in Texas. 

During flu season, influenza virus is an obvious cause for a spike in hospital admissions for acute respiratory symptoms - but if confirmation of that pathogen relies on a testing platform that can miss a third of infected individuals (only 17/45 PCR positives were detected by am RIDT in Ref#2) then antivirals may not be used in time. In a more recent comparison of RIDTs using PCR results as the standard, viral load in the upper airway (less virus gave fewer positives - duh), age (the young and elderly were less often positive), presentation time (sampling >2-days after onset of illness reduced the proportion of positivity), virus type (less sensitive for subtype B infections than A) and whether there was pneumonia or not (the former were less often positive perhaps reflecting less viral replication in the upper airway than in the lower airway?) were factors in how well the antibody-based RIDTs performed. Sensitivity ranged from 50% to 94%. These 2 studies used samples from the upper airways (swabs or nasopharyngeal aspirates respectively, as suggested by the BD� Directigen EX Flu A+B assay, Alere� Influenza A & B Test and the QuickVue� 117 Influenza A+B test)

In these instances, PCR-based methods (used as the "gold standard" in those published evaluations) shine but they take longer to generate a result and require more expertise to conduct than a rapid test. The slightly longer time is not just because they take hours to conduct instead of the minutes of a rapid test (remembering that viral lab diagnoses used to take days not hours) but because lab testing is only part of a process which also involves paperwork and passing verified and signed off results and information to all concerned clicnial parties and patients. That can take more time-and sometimes be a bottleneck for result release. Its hard for a patient's family and friends to wait, but the results will be that much more reliable when they come.

A feature of influenza season is the concurrently reduced levels of activity of other viruses. Influenza tends to "push out" a lot of other viruses during it's peak season - probably reflecting influenza's ability to dominate the immune response in an infected individual, and by extrapolation, reduces the number of susceptible individuals at the community level, remembering that the majority of influenza cases are acute upper respiratory tract illnesses.

So it looks more like the Montgomery County deaths may have been due to the high levels of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus generally circulating in them there parts. A KHOU news outlet report, also circulated on ProMED, suggest that 4 Montgomery county deaths were due to H1N1, as well as other sine the regions. However, the Montgomery County Public Health District reports only 2 H1N1-confirmed deaths, so things are still a little confusing there. And as for whet other viruses may also be in these patients...so far, who knows?


A brief guide to some terms used in these sorts of discussions (also from Ref #2 below)

Sensitivity
No. of true positives / no of true positives and false negatives

Specificity
No. of true negatives / no of true negatives and false positives

Positive predictive value
No. of true positives / no of true positives plus no. of false positives

Negative predictive value
No. of true negatives/ no of true negatives


References and further reading...
  1. FluTrackers story. http://www.flutrackers.com/forum/showthread.php?p=517368#post517368
  2. Accuracy of rapid influenza diagnostic test and immunofluorescence assay compared to real time RT-PCR in children with influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 infection. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23175329
  3. Clinical and Virologic Factors Associated with Reduced Sensitivity of Rapid Influenza Diagnostic Tests in Hospitalized Elderly and Young Children. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24285739

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